According to Goldman (1991) curiosity is a desire for true belief; by contrast, Williamson views curiosity as a desire for knowledge. De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. He claims that while we would generally expect her to have knowledge of her relevant beliefs, this is not essential for her understanding and as a result it would not matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (and were therefore merely accidentally true). Gives an overview of recent arguments for revisionist theories of epistemic value that suggest understanding is more valuable than knowledge. Morris, K. A Defense of Lucky Understanding. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2012): 357-371. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. However, such a strong view would also make understanding nearly unobtainable and surely very rarefor example, on the extremely strong proposal under consideration, recognized experts in a field would be denied understanding if they had a single false belief about some very minor aspect of the subject matter. To the extent that this is correct, there is some cause for reservation about measuring degrees of understanding according to how well they approximate the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. A proponent of Khalifas position might, however, view the preceding response as question-begging. What is the grasping relation? He suggests that the primary object of a priori knowledge is the modal reality itself that is grasped by the mind and that on this basis we go on to assent to the proposition that describes these relationships. (iii) an ability to draw from the information that q the conclusion that p (or that probably p). fort hood cif inprocessing; bucks county inspector of elections candidates; lockdown limerick poem; boeing seattle badge office. In recent years epistemology has experienced gradual changes that are critical in human life. New York: Routledge, 2011. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. In the first version, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumors that turn out to be luckily true. How should an account of objectual understanding incorporate these types of observationsnamely, where the falsity of a central belief or central beliefs appears compatible with the retention of some degree of understanding? Khalifa, K. Understanding, Grasping and Luck. Episteme 10 (1) (2013b): 1-17. This point aligns with the datum that we often attribute understanding by degrees. DePaul, M. Ugly Analysis and Value in A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. In . This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Looks at the increasing dissatisfaction with ever-more complicated attempts to generate a theory of knowledge immune to counterexamples. Owing to Kvanvigs use of the words perceived achievement, Grimm thinks that the curiosity account of understandings value suggests that subjective understanding (or what is referred to as intelligibility above) can satisfy the desire to make sense of the world or really marks the legitimate end of inquiry.. A monograph that explores the nature and value of achievements in great depth. Epistemological Relativism: Arguments Pro and Con Where should an investigation of understanding in epistemology take us next? Is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so forth? Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127. Outlines and evaluates the anti-intellectualist and intellectualist views of know-how. Working hypotheses and idealizations need not, on this line, be viewed as representative of realityidealizations can be taken as useful fictions, and working hypotheses are recognized as the most parsimonious theories on the table without thereby being dubbed as wholly accurate. Kvanvig identifies the main opponent to his view, that the scope of curiosity is enough to support the unrestricted value of understanding, to be one on which knowledge is what is fundamental to curiosity. facebook android official. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge. Synthese 191 (2014): 945-959. See, however, Carter & Gordon (2014) for a recent criticism on the point of identifying understanding with strong cognitive achievement. A. and Gordon, E. C. On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2014): 1-14. Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. Much of the philosophical tradition has viewed the central epistemological problems concerning perception largely and sometimes exclusively in terms of the metaphysical responses to skepticism. Whitcomb, D. Epistemic Value In A. Cullison (ed. Grimm anticipates this point and expresses a willingness to embrace a looser conception of dependence than causal dependence, one that includes (following Kim 1994) species of dependence such as mereological dependences (that is, dependence of a whole on its parts), evaluative dependences (that is, dependence of evaluative on non-evaluative), and so on. epistemological shift pros and cons - roci.biz . Positivism follows an identical approach as the study of natural sciences in the testing of a theory. If Pritchard is right to claim that understanding is always a strong cognitive achievement, then understanding is always finally valuable if cognitive achievement is also always finally valuable, and moreover, valuable in a way that knowledge is not. The proponent of moderate factivity owes an explanation. Nonetheless, Zagzebski thinks that believing this actually allows us more understanding for most purposes than the vastly more complicated truth owing to our cognitive limitations. He argues that intuitions that rule against lucky understanding can be explained away. Since Kvanvig claims that the coherence-making relationships that are traditionally construed as necessary for justification on a coherentist picture are the very relations that one grasps (for example, the objects of grasping) when one understands, the justification literature may be a promising place to begin. For example, he attempts to explain the intuitions in Pritchards intervening luck spin on Kvanvigs Comanche case by noting that some of the temptation to deny understanding here relates to the writer of the luckily-true book himself lacking the relevant understanding. That is, we often describe an individual as having a better understanding of a subject matter than some other person, perhaps when choosing whom to approach for advice or when looking for someone to teach us about a subject. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. Hills thinks that mere propositional knowledge does not essentially involve any of these abilities even if (as per the point above) propositional knowledge requires other kinds of abilities. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. epistemological shift pros and cons - hashootrust.org.pk Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding. In T. Henning and D. Schweikard (eds. epistemological shift pros and cons. Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). Resists the alleged similarity between understanding and knowing-how. Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. 13. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Salmon, W. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. This is a view to which Grimm (2010) is also sympathetic, remarking that the object of objectual understanding can be profitably viewed along the lines of the object of know-how, where Grimm has in mind here an anti-intellectualist interpretation of know-how according to which knowing how to do something is a matter of possessing abilities rather than knowing facts (compare, Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b). Van Camp, W. Explaining Understanding (or Understanding Explanation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(1) (2014): 95-114. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Many epistemologists have sought to distinguish understanding from knowledge on the basis of alleged differences in the extent to which knowledge and understanding are susceptible to being undermined by certain kinds of epistemic luck. Defends views that hold explanation as indispensable for account of understanding and discusses what a non-factive account of grasping would look like. But no one claims that science has as yet arrived at the truth about the motion of the planets. In other words, one mistakenly take knowledge to be distinctively valuable only because knowledge often does have somethingcognitive achievementwhich is essential to understanding and which is finally valuable. reptarium brian barczyk; new milford high school principal; salisbury university apparel store Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. epistemological shift pros and cons. Contains the famous counterexamples to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge. The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69. Although, many commentators suggest that understanding requires something further, that is something in additional to merely knowing a proposition or propositions, Grimm thinks we can update the knowledge of causes view so that this intuition is accommodated and explained. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. Proponents of weak factivity must address both of these potentially problematic results. However, Elgin takes this line further and insists thatwith some qualificationsfalse central beliefs, and not merely false peripheral beliefs, are compatible with understanding a subject matter to some degree. This type of a view is a revisionist theory of epistemic value (see, for example, Pritchard 2010), which suggests that one would be warranted in turning more attention to an epistemic state other than propositional knowledgespecifically, according to Pritchardunderstanding. Secondly, there is plenty of scope for understanding to play a more significant role in social epistemology. Should we say that the use of the term understanding that applies to such cases should be of no interest to epistemology? Rohwer, Y. Pritchard (2007) has put forward some ideas that may prevent the need to adopt a weak view of understandings factivity while nonetheless maintaining the key thrust of Elgins insight. bella vista catholic charities housing; wills point tx funeral homes; ptvi triathlon distance; is frankie beverly in the hospital; birria tacos long branch; For example, we might suppose that a system of beliefs contains only beliefs about a particular subject matter, and that these beliefs will ordinarily be sufficient for a rational believer who possesses them to answer questions about that subject matter reliably. ), The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding. This is of course an unpalatable result, as we regularly attribute understanding in the presence of not just one, but often many, false beliefs. Though the demandingness of this ability need not be held fixed across practical circumstances. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Sullivan, E. Understanding: Not Know-How. Philosohpical Studies (2017). Meanwhile, he suggests that were you to ask a fake fire officer who appeared to you to be a real officer and just happened to give the correct answer, it is no longer plausible (by Pritchards lights) that you have understanding-why. For those who wonder about whether the often-discussed grasping associated with understanding might just amount to the possession of further beliefs (rather than, say, the possession of manipulative abilities), this type of view may seem particularly attractive (and comparatively less mysterious). Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support your position presented in the paper. If so, why, and if not why not? This is a change from the past. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. London: Routledge, 2009. He also suggests, like Khalifa, that grasping be linked with correct explanations. In this Gettier-style case, she has good reason to believe her true beliefs, but the source of these beliefs (for example, the rumor mill) is highly unreliable and this makes her beliefs only luckily true, in the sense of intervening epistemic luck. If Kelps thought experiment works, manipulation of representations cannot be a necessary condition of understanding after all. (For example, is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so on? Carter, J. However, the core explanationist insight also offers the resources to supplement a grasping account. One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why.